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Abstract
Data protection within information systems is one of the main concerns in computer systems security and
diﬀerent access control policies can be used to specify the access requests that should be granted or denied.
These access control mechanisms should guarantee that information can be accessed only by authorized
users and thus prevent all information leakage. We propose a methodology for specifying and implementing
access control policies using the rewrite based framework Tom. This approach allows us to check that any
reachable state obtained following a granted access in the implementation satisﬁes the policy speciﬁcation.
We show that when security levels are not totally ordered some information leakage can be detected.
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1 Introduction
The main principle in information ﬂow policies is to avoid information from higher
security levels to be stored in resources with lower security levels. More generally,
security-sensitive information should not be accessible to lower-privileged subjects.
In this paper we will consider a “resource” (also called object) as an abstract con-
cept, deﬁned informally as a container of information. Subjects can be understood
as human users, but it is more meaningful to think of them as programs. Typical
examples of resources are ﬁles and directories in an operating system. For instance,
an information ﬂow policy states that a subject must be denied to copy a sensitive
ﬁle, such as /etc/shadow in a UNIX ﬁle system (which contains all encrypted pass-
words), to a ﬁle with less restrictive rights, even if a program run by root is trying
to perform such operation.
The mechanisms employed in order to enforce this kind of policy involve dis-
cretionary access control, and a system-wide mandatory policy, stipulating that
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resources can be owned by individual users, but that the system is able to override
any user permissions, under certain circumstances and more precisely, when princi-
pals try to violate the information ﬂow property. This is the approach followed by
Bell and LaPadula (BLP) in their seminal work on mandatory access control [2].
Nevertheless, it is very hard to prove that a system starting on a valid conﬁguration
will reach only secure or valid states by analyzing the access control rules. This is in
part due to the fact that typical information ﬂow properties are expressed in terms
of desirable read-write and write-read traces. Roughly speaking, since systems are
abstracted as Turing machines, checking an information ﬂow property corresponds
to checking whether the machine enters a given state, which is in general undecid-
able.
In this paper, we show that it is not enough to assume that the security policy
specifying the authorized accesses is correctly deﬁned based on these traces, because
some models can allow some sequences of requests that will indirectly violate the
policy. We propose a method to make explicit such ﬂows in a given state of the sys-
tem. We use rewrite rules both to describe the access control policy and to explore
information ﬂow over the reachable states of a system. We propose an analysis tech-
nique that can automatically identify information leakages which may invalidate an
implementation of an information ﬂow policy. We use as support language the Tom
framework, a language extension which adds new matching primitives to existing
imperative languages. It allows users to write concise speciﬁcations and eﬃcient
validation methods possibly using features of the host language.
We apply our technique on two well-known models in the computer security
literature. We consider the security model proposed by McLean in [8], whose inten-
tion is to generalize the Bell and LaPadula model for dealing with joint access. We
show that conﬁdentiality is compromised when some simplifying assumptions made
in order to relate the general framework for joint access with BLP are taken.
We extend our previous work [9] by separating the veriﬁcation procedure from
the intrinsic characteristics of the policy model. Moreover, the veriﬁcation tech-
nique used in the current approach is more generic in the sense that checking other
policies can be done if the speciﬁcation and implementation of the respective policy
are provided (as a Tom class). In [9], the exploration of the search space was inﬂu-
enced by the analyzed policy and more precisely the access requests are performed
following an order deduced from the policy speciﬁcation. Consequently, other per-
mutations of requests that would lead to diﬀerent states are discarded and thus, the
algorithm was not complete. The present approach provides a complete procedure
which can make use of diﬀerent optimizations to reduce the search space. Most of
these optimizations are independent of the security model being checked (provided
this model’s properties depend on the set of current accesses), whereas they were
hard coded in the former procedure. As we will see in Section 5.4, some natu-
ral assumptions on the policy model make it possible to implement more powerful
optimizations of the search space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the BLP
and the McLean models for multilevel security. Section 3 introduces the Tom system
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and Section 4 presents the encoding of the two policies in Tom. Section 5 shows
how these models can be checked and proposes some optimizations used to cut the
search space to speed-up the execution of the veriﬁcation process. In Section 6 we
discuss some related works and conclude the paper.
2 Lattice-based security models
We focus here on two lattice-based security models [14] which impose constraints
on the way information can ﬂow from one security level in the lattice to another.
2.1 The Bell and LaPadula Model
Bell and LaPadula have formalized the concept of mandatory access controls [2,3]
originally targeted to the military domain. The essence of the BLP model is to
augment discretionary access controls, represented in an access control matrix, with
mandatory access controls to enforce information ﬂow policies. Without loss of
generality, we focus only on the mandatory part in this paper, which is really speciﬁc
to the BLP model. Therefore we do not describe how the contents of the access
control matrix can be modiﬁed by subjects, but we consider that the current state
of the system is exactly the set of access tuples the matrix contains. Also, the
notation and precise formulation of the rules of BLP used here are substantially
diﬀerent from those of the original Bell-LaPadula work, since we use a more up-to-
date interpretation of these concepts in line with our formalism.
In BLP the relation among the security levels from the set L is a total ordering 
whose most common classes are: top secret  secret  conﬁdential  unclassiﬁed .
In the following we consider a set of subjects S and a set of objects O together with
two functions fs : S → L and fo : O → L which give the corresponding security
clearances for subjects and classiﬁcations for objects.
If we consider a set A of actions containing {read,write} and a list M of tuples
of the form m(S,O,A) representing the actions that have been performed so far in
the system, then the mandatory rules for the BLP model are:
∀s∈S ∀o∈O
m(s, o, read) ∈ M ⇒ fs(s)  fo(o)
(1)
∀s∈S ∀o1, o2∈O
m(s, o1, read) ∈ M ∧m(s, o2, write) ∈M ⇒ fo(o2)  fo(o1)
(2)
The properties (1) and (2) are known respectively as the simple secure property
and the -secure property. The ﬁrst property states that if a subject performs a
read access on an object then the level of the subject dominates that of the object.
The second one allows a user reading from an object o1 to write only objects whose
levels dominate that of o1. Intuitively, this means that information read from one
level cannot be disclosed towards lower level objects. We should point out that
write access is interpreted here as write only.
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From a practical point of view, the -property would not be applied to human
users, but rather to programs. Human users are trusted not to leak information. A
secret user can write an unclassiﬁed document because we assume that he or she
will put only unclassiﬁed information in it. Programs, on the other hand, are not
trusted because they can embed Trojan horses. The -property prohibits a program
running at the secret level from writing to unclassiﬁed objects, even if it is permitted
to do so by discretionary access controls.
2.2 The McLean Model
The algebra of security of McLean [8] is seen as a generalization of the BLP model.
One of the new concepts introduced in this approach is joint access, which is the
capability to express that a given task must be accomplished by a set of subjects
concurrently. In the military ﬁeld, this allows to capture the idea that two individ-
uals need to command at the same time a missile launch, for instance. Privileges
are then represented as tuples of the form (S, o, x), where S is a non-empty set of
subjects, o is an object and x is an access mode.
In [8], the -secure property was modiﬁed to take joint access into account. If
we consider the list M of current accesses, then this property is stated as follows:
“a state is -secure if for any (sets of) subjects S1, S2 and objects o1, o2, if
m(S1, o1, read) ∈ M and m(S2, o2, write) ∈ M and the classiﬁcation of o1 domi-
nates that of o2, then S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ ”
A direct translation of this sentence leads to the following logical formula:
∀S1, S2 ∀o1, o2 ∈ O
(m(S1, o1, read) ∈ M ∧m(S2, o2, write) ∈M ∧ fo(o1) 
 fo(o2))⇒ S1 ∩ S2 = ∅
This expression is logically equivalent (by contraposition) to:
∀S1, S2 ∀o1, o2 ∈ O
(m(S1, o1, read) ∈ M ∧m(S2, o2, write) ∈M ∧ S1 ∩ S2 = ∅)⇒ ¬(fo(o1) 
 fo(o2))
The BLP model can be obtained from the McLean one by considering it as a
particular case of the joint access model where every set of subjects S is reduced to
a singleton {s} and thus the above property becomes:
∀s∈S ∀o1, o2∈O,
m({s}, o1, read)∈M∧m({s}, o2, write)∈M ⇒ ¬(fo(o1) 
 fo(o2))
(3)
This property is equivalent to the -property of BLP (2) only when the order among
security levels is total since only in this situation we have [7]:
¬(fo(o1) 
 fo(o2))⇔ (fo(o2)  fo(o1))
In general, actual implementations of multilevel security models adopt partial
orders to compare security levels, having non-linear lattice structures. Military
systems often employ extra labels to annotate the security levels. This practice
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introduces “compartments”, for instance secretNavy and secretArmy. Thus, subjects
with clearance secretNavy may access objects with the same classiﬁcation, but not
those from the secretArmy class. Thus, the corresponding lattice of security levels
has incomparable elements [14].
Therefore, in McLean’s interpretation of BLP, a subject will be able not only to
write objects with a superior security classiﬁcation than his, but also those objects
which cannot be compared to its security clearance. We show that this formulation is
not only less restrictive than the original BLP model, but may also allow information
leaks to happen.
3 Short introduction to Tom
Tom is a language extension which adds new matching primitives to existing impera-
tive languages, and in particular Java. This is particularly well-suited for describing
transformations on structured entities like trees/terms. The language provides sup-
port for matching modulo associativity and neutral element, which is particularly
useful to manage lists of objects and to model the search space exploration.
The main originality of this system is its integration into existing languages,
which makes it possible to use eﬃcient and well-designed runtime libraries. For
example, in the presented work, we make an intensive use of the Collection frame-
work provided by the Java API. From an implementation point of view, Tom is a
compiler which accepts several native languages as input, like C or Java, and whose
compilation process consists in translating the matching constructs into the under-
lying native language. For an interested reader, design and implementation issues
related to Tom are presented in [10,1].
In addition to matching constructs, Tom oﬀers support (via Gom) for the def-
inition of algebraic data-structures. Gom is a generator of abstract syntax tree
implementations [16] which takes a many-sorted signature as input (composed of
constructor symbols), and generates an eﬃcient Java implementation. The gen-
erated code is characterized by strong typing combined with maximal sub-term
sharing for memory eﬃciency and constant time equality checking.
For expository reasons, we assume that Tom only adds two new constructs:
%match and back-quote (‘). The ﬁrst construct is similar to the match primitive of
ML and related languages: given a term (called subject) and a list of pairs pattern-
action, the match primitive selects a pattern that matches the subject and performs
the associated action. This construct may thus be seen as an extension of the
classical switch/case construct. The second construct is a mechanism that allows
one to easily build ground terms over a deﬁned signature. This operator, called
back-quote, is followed by a well-formed term built over constructors, variables and
function calls. This term is written in preﬁx notation.
In order to give a better understanding of Tom’s features, let us consider that
read is a binary symbol used to represent the access of a given subject to a
resource (both characterized by an identiﬁer and a security level). For instance,
the following statement assigns to the Java variable a the read access of the re-
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source abstract by the subject bob:
Access a = ‘read(subject("bob,"secret"),
resource("abstract","confidential"));
Such a Java variable can be matched for checking if an access is authorized or not:
%match(a) {
read(subject(x,l1),resource(y,l1)) -> {
print("same level");
}
read(subject(x,l1),resource(y,l2)) -> {
if(l1<l2) print("denied");
}
}
This example should be read as follows: given a term a (that represents an Access),
the evaluation of %match prints "same level" if the involved subjects and resources
have the same security level and "denied" when the access is not authorized. This is
implemented by non-linear pattern matching: l1 occurs twice in the ﬁrst pattern.
The reader should note that variables do not need to be declared, their type is
automatically inferred from the deﬁnitions of the operators using them. The action
associated to a pattern is a Java statement which can be guarded using the classical
if construct. In the second pattern, we retrieve the two security levels l1 and l2,
and we assume that < is an order that makes their comparison possible. When l1
is less than l2, the "denied" message is printed.
As mentioned previously, an important feature of Tom is to support list match-
ing, also known as associative matching with neutral element. For instance, lists
of accesses can be represented using the associative operator accesses and the
veriﬁcation of the -security property can be encoded as follows:
%match(listOfAccesses) {
accesses(_*,read(s,resource(_,l1),_*,
write(s,resource(_,l2),_*)) -> {
if(l1>l2) {
return false; // *-property not verified
}
}
}
In this example, one can remark the use of list variables, annotated by a ‘*’: such a
variable should be instantiated by a (possibly empty) list. In this example, in order
to avoid giving a name to variables not reused in the action side, we used anonymous
variables, denoted by ‘_’. Given a list of accesses, the matching algorithm tries to
ﬁnd two accesses (a read and a write) performed by the same subject s and such
that the level l1 is higher than l2. When such a match is found this code returns
false.
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4 Encoding the policies in Tom
In this section we give an encoding in Tom of the security properties of the BLP
and McLean policies and propose implementations that will be checked against
these properties. Each policy is encoded by a class that extends the abstract class
Policy which declares two abstract functions: valid and transition.
The function transition deﬁned in each concrete class encodes the implemen-
tation of the respective policy, and deﬁnes the state transition following an access
request; the state does not change if the request is denied and the corresponding
access is added to the list of current accesses only if the request is granted. Each of
the obtained states can be checked against the function valid, which is deﬁned for
each policy by encoding their speciﬁc security properties.
4.1 Data structures
The datatypes corresponding to the main entities present in the deﬁnition of an
access control policy — the subjects, the objects and the accesses performed by
subjects on objects — are deﬁned abstractly using many-sorted signatures and,
more precisely, we use Gom to generate a Java implementation which ensures max-
imal sub-term sharing. We will also deﬁne the current state as the list of accesses
performed so far in the system.
Subjects and objects (called in what follows resources in order to avoid the
potential conﬂicts with the Object class of Java) are characterized by an integer id
and a security level built on strings:
Subject = subject(id:int,sl:SecurityLevel)
Resource = resource(id:int,sl:SecurityLevel)
SecurityLevel = sl(l:String)
Subjects and objects can be easily grouped together in lists built using the (asso-
ciative) operators subjects and resources respectively:
ListOfSubjects = subjects(Subject*)
ListOfResources = resources(Resource*)
The accesses performed by subjects on resources can be of type read or write.
For extensibility reasons, the access mode can be also speciﬁed explicitly using the
access operator:
Access = read(subject:Subject,resource:Resource)
| write(subject:Subject,resource:Resource)
| access(mode:int,subject:Subject,resource:Resource)
The access modes 0 and 1 are associated to read and write accesses; this corre-
spondence is enforced using rewriting rules which are systematically applied:
rules() {
access(0,s,r) -> read(s,r)
access(1,s,r) -> write(s,r)
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}The global state of the system is deﬁned as the list of already performed accesses
State = state(accesses:ListOfAccesses)
ListOfAccesses = accesses(Access*)
A request can be made for gaining access to a resource (add) or for releasing a
(previously obtained) access (delete):
Request = add(access:Access)
| delete(access:Access)
ListOfRequests = requests(Request*)
An access request can be granted or denied according to the accesses already per-
formed in the system.
Decision = grant(state:State)
| deny(state:State)
For the purpose of this paper we only consider grant and deny decisions but the
deﬁnition can be easily extended to more elaborated decisions (like not-applicable
for example). Similarly, the deﬁnition of a state can be easily extended to contain
more information like the security levels of the subjects when they are dynamic or
other environment speciﬁc data.
The security levels lattice is encoded using a list of lists of security levels:
SecurityLevelsLattice = slLattice(SecurityLevelsSet*)
SecurityLevelsSet = slSet(SecurityLevel*)
The levels from each list are comparable with the ﬁrst element being the lowest and
the last the biggest. When the security levels are totally ordered the lattice is spec-
iﬁed by only one list containing all the security levels. For example, the order intro-
duced in Section 2.1 can be encoded by slLattice(slSet(sl("unclassified"),
sl("confidential"), sl("secret"), sl("top secret"))). We should men-
tion that no check is done on the coherence between the orders speciﬁed by each list
but this can be easily done by extending the construction functions of slLattice
and slSet with explicit rewriting rules.
The comparison of two security levels with respect to the given lattice can be
implemented as follows:
public int compare(SecurityLevel l1,SecurityLevel l2) {
if(l1==l2) { return 0; }
%match (this) { // a lattice of security levels
slLattice(_*,slSet(_*,m,_*,n,_*),_*) -> {
if(l1==m && l2==n) { return -1; }
if(l2==m && l1==n) { return 1; }
}
}
return 100; // l1 and l2 are incomparable
}
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Note the use of associative matching to describe the search of an slSet which
contains the two elements we want to compare. Auxiliary functions like leq, ge,
etc. can be easily deﬁned using the function compare.
public boolean leq(SecurityLevel l1,SecurityLevel l2) {
int v = compare(l1,l2);
return (v==0 || v==-1);
}
4.2 Encoding the security properties
The properties (1) and (2) given in Section 2.1 deﬁne in fact the acceptable states
with respect to the BLP policy. This is encoded in Tom by a predicate valid(State
cs) that evaluates to true if the given state cs is acceptable and to false otherwise.
A given state is not valid w.r.t. the BLP policy if one of its current accesses
is a read access involving a resource with a security level which is not lower than
that of the concerned subject (1) or if the state is not -secure (2). The validity of
a state depends on the current state and on the security levels lattice of the given
instance of the policy. The attribute slL deﬁnes this lattice of security levels for the
corresponding policy and it is initialized when an instance of the Tom class encoding
the given policy is created.
public boolean valid(State cs) {
%match(cs) {
state(accesses(_*,read(subject(_,ssl),resource(_,rsl)),_*)) -> {
if(!slL.leq(rsl,ssl)) { return false; }
}
state(accesses(_*,read(s,resource(_,rsl1)),_*,
write(s,resource(_,rsl2)),_*)) -> {
if(!slL.leq(rsl1,rsl2)) { return false; }
}
}
return true;
}
As far as it concerns the McLean policy, the simple secure property is exactly the
same, however the -secure property (3) is slightly diﬀerent and corresponds to the
following matching statement:
state(accesses(_*,read(s,resource(_,rsl1)),_*,
write(s,resource(_,rsl2)),_*)) -> {
if(slL.le(rsl2,rsl1)) { return false; }
}
These functions are used in the checker for testing whether all reachable states are
valid by using the the implementations of both policies.
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4.3 BLP and McLean implementations
The implementation of a policy can be seen as a function Decision
transition(Request req, State cs) that given an access request req and a state
cs (deﬁned by the list of previously granted accesses) returns a (grant or deny) de-
cision. These decisions are taken based not only on the current state but depend
also on the precise security levels lattice of the given instance of the policy.
The implementation of the BLP policy is realized starting from the properties
(1) and (2) given in Section 2.1. We focus on the denied accesses and thus we
consider the negation of the previously mentioned properties:
¬(fs(s)  fo(o)) ⇒ m(s, o, read) ∈ M(4)
¬(fo(o2)  fo(o1))⇒ m(s, o1, read) ∈ M ∨m(s, o2, write) ∈M(5)
A read request is denied if either the subject does not have enough privileges to
read the corresponding object (4) or if there exist write accesses by the same subject
and the security levels of the objects already written by the respective subject are
not higher than the level of the object to read (5). This is achieved by matching
the current request and state and check whether these conditions are satisﬁed:
%match(req,cs) {
add(read(subject(_,ssl1),resource(_,rsl1))), _ -> {
// not enough privileges to read
if(!slL.leq(rsl1,ssl1)) { return ‘deny(cs); }
}
add(read(s,resource(_,rsl1))),
state(accesses(_*,write(s,resource(_,rsl2)),_*)) -> {
// existing write access with lower level
if(!slL.leq(rsl1,rsl2)) { return ‘deny(cs); }
} }
Write access requests are handled similarly: the decision is in this case independent
of the relationship between the levels of the subject and of the object but the write
access of a subject over an object is denied if the subject has already performed a
read access and the security level of the read object is not lower than that of the
written object (5).
%match(req,cs) {
add(write(s,resource(_,rsl1))),
state(accesses(_*,read(s,resource(_,rsl2)),_*)) -> {
// existing write access with lower level
if(!slL.leq(rsl2,rsl1)) { return ‘deny(cs); }
} }
If none of these conditions is satisﬁed then the access is granted resulting in a new
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state with containing this latter access.
%match(req,cs) {
add(newAccess), state(accesses) -> {
return ‘grant(state(accesses(newAccess,accesses*)));
} }
We proceed similarly for the implementation of the McLean policy by adopting this
time properties (1) and (3) given in Section 2.1. The implementation is the same
as before except for the -property whose negation is
fo(o1) 
 fo(o2)⇒ m({s}, o1, read) ∈M ∨m({s}, o2, write) ∈M(6)
A read request is denied in this model if there exist write accesses by the same
subject and the security levels of the objects already written by the respective
subject are smaller than the level of the read object (6).
%match(req,cs) {
add(write(s,resource(_,rsl1))),
state(accesses(_*,read(s,resource(_,rsl2)),_*)) -> {
if(slL.ge(rsl2,rsl1)) { return ‘deny(cs); }
} }
A similar rule is used for the read access requests.
4.4 Computing implicit accesses
In our approach, a state is represented by the list of authorized accesses. Of course,
this list contains the accesses that have been explicitly requested and granted, but
it should also contain the accesses that correspond to a possible information ﬂow.
These accesses can be deduced by transitive closure:
m(s1, o1, read) ∧m(s1, o2, write) ∧m(s2, o2, read)⇒ m(s2, o1, read)(7)
To ensure at the implementation level that a state always contains both explicit
and implicit accesses, we rely on the hook mechanism provided by Gom [13]. A hook
is a specialization of a construction function. Instead of just allocating the memory
to represent a constructor of the signature, a hook performs some additional
treatments ensuring that the resulting term is in a particular canonical form. In
our case we want to ensure that the implicit accesses are always represented in a
state. This is implemented by specializing the insertion of an access e in a list l
and by considering four cases:
accesses:make_insert(e,l) {
// do not add an access already there
if(l.contains(e)) { return l; }
%match(e,l) {
read(s1,o1), accesses(_*,read(s2,o2),_*,write(s1,o2),_*)
| read(s2,o2), accesses(_*,read(s1,o1),_*,write(s1,o2),_*)
| write(s1,o2), accesses(_*,read(s1,o1),_*,read(s2,o2),_*)
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| write(s1,o2), accesses(_*,read(s2,o2),_*,read(s1,o1),_*) -> {
return ‘accesses(read(s2,o1),realMake(e,l));
}
}
}
The ‘|’ stands for a disjunction of patterns. The realMake function, which consists
in the “inner” default allocation function. This function takes the same number of
arguments as the hook. In any case, if the hooks code does not perform a return
itself, this realMake function is called at the end of the hook execution, with the
corresponding hooks arguments.
5 Search space exploration
5.1 Simple checker
A ﬁrst naive version of the checker uses the lists of subjects S = (s1, . . . , sm)
and resources R = (r1, . . . , rn) to generate a list of potential requests
L = (read(si, rj), write(si, rj), . . .) with i ∈ [1..m], j ∈ [1..n]. Then starting
from an empty state, it performs a transition for each request r ∈ L. Each
transition leads to a new state and the process is applied recursively on this new
state and L \ {r}. When L is empty, the reached state is checked whether it is
valid with respect to the security properties. This can be implemented as follows
in Tom:
void checker(State s, Policy p,
ListOfRequests previous,
ListOfRequests lor) {
%match(lor) { // generate all possible permutations
requests(R1*,r@(add|delete)((read|write)(subject,resource)),
R2*) -> {
Decision decision = p.transition(‘r,s);
State newState = decision.getstate();
ListOfRequests nextLor, nextPrevious;
if(decision.isgrant()) {
nextPrevious = ‘requests();
nextLor = ‘requests(previous*,R1*,R2*);
} else {
// opt: on deny, do not re-explore previous and R1
nextPrevious = ‘requests(previous*,R1*);
nextLor = ‘requests(R2*);
}
checker(newState,p,nextPrevious,nextLor,newTraces);
}
// do the validation when the list of requests is empty
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requests() -> {
if(p.valid(s) == false) {
System.out.println("LEAKAGE DETECTED");
} } } }
It is important to remark in the code above that the action part does not contain
return statements: all the solutions of the matching problem are computed. Com-
bined with a recursive call to checker, this computes all possible permutations of
the initial list of requests.
When, for a given permutation, all the transitions have been explored, the va-
lidity of the resulting state is checked and a message is printed when an information
leakage is detected. This approach is sound and complete.
5.2 Information leakage
The execution of this checker for BLP policies with diﬀerent combinations of com-
parable and incomparable security levels showed no information leakage. On the
other hand, the execution of the checker for a McLean policy with a security lattice
containing two incomparable levels s(ecret)Army and c(onfidential)Navy reveals the
following information leakage:
S1(sArmy)
write

























 read R1(sArmy)
S2(cNavy) 
read R2(cNavy)
The depicted accesses correspond to valid transitions: since the two security levels
are not comparable, the expression ge(sArmy,cNavy) tested when a write access
is requested in the McLean policy (Section 4.3) is evaluated to false and thus the
access is granted. On the other hand, the state containing these three accesses is
not valid since the implicit read access of R1(sArmy) by S2(cNavy) does not satisfy
the simple secure property (since !leq(sArmy,cNavy) evaluates to true).
One can argue that the simple secure property of McLean should be modiﬁed
to use a similar test as for the -secure property. The simple secure property (1)
would become in this case:
∀s ∈ S ∀o ∈ O m(s, o, read) ∈ M ⇒ ¬(fs(o) 
 fo(s))
The previous scenario is no longer possible in this case but we obtain another
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situation corresponding to an information leakage:
S1(sArmy)
write

























 read R1(sArmy)
S2(cNavy)
write


























 read R2(cNavy)
R3(ucArmy)
where uc stands for unclassiﬁed and sArmy  ucArmy but there is no relationship
between these levels and cNavy .
Once again all the (depicted) explicit accesses correspond to valid transitions
but this time the implicit read access of R1(sArmy) by S2(cNavy) is valid as well.
On the other hand, this implicit access together with the write access of R3(ucArmy)
by S2(cNavy) leads to a violation of the -secure property since le(ucArmy,sArmy)
evaluates to true.
5.3 A ﬁrst optimization: caches and canonical forms
Checking if a state is valid is a frequently performed operation. To improve its
eﬃciency, we store the valid states in a cache: a hash-map where the least recently
used entry is dropped when needed.
Given a state and a list of requests that has to be explored, we also use a cache
technique to store the already visited pairs (state, remaining requests), avoiding to
explore twice the same search branch.
It is important to note that this approach is only eﬀective if the equiva-
lent states are represented in a unique way. For instance, consider the terms
‘state(accesses(a1,a2)) and ‘state(accesses(a2,a1)) of sort State (where
a1 and a2 are of sort Access). They represent equivalent states since the order of
granted accesses is not relevant. To reﬂect this equivalence class at the implemen-
tation level, we use the hook mechanism again to specialize the list construction
function obtaining automatically sorted lists of accesses. We only present here the
sorting algorithm but this code should be, of course, combined with the computation
of implicit states presented previously:
accesses:make_insert(e,l) {
// do not add an access already there
if(l.contains(e)) { return l; }
%match(l) {
accesses() -> { return ‘realMake(e,accesses()); }
accesses(head,tail*) -> {
if(e.compareToLPO(‘head) > 0) {
return ‘realMake(head,accesses(e,tail*));
} else {
return ‘realMake(e,l);
H. Cirstea et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 234 (2009) 37–5450
} } } }
Note the use of realMake which is the function that eﬀectively concatenates e
and l (realMake can only be used in a construction function). Note also that
compareToLPO is an automatically generated total ordering function.
In practice, these optimizations are essential to reduce the search space and the
memory footprint, as well as to improve the overall eﬃciency.
5.4 A more eﬀective optimization: cut on deny
The optimizations presented in the previous section are independent of the security
model being checked provided its properties depend on the set of current accesses.
More eﬀective optimizations can be obtained if some assumptions are made on the
analyzed policy model. In particular, if we suppose that any granted access (and the
corresponding modiﬁcation of the set of current accesses) would lead to a new state
where less requests will be granted, then the only states that should be checked are
those obtained following a granted access; all the denied requests lead to states that
will be eventually reached if only granted requests are considered. This assumption
is obviously satisﬁed for the policies we considered but would not be reasonable for
an access policy that requests, for example, two previously granted accesses of two
subjects before granting the access for a third subject. The optimization proposed
below works thus for the policies analyzed here but cannot be generalized to all
access policies.
The new checker is simpler and more eﬃcient:
private static void otherChecker(State s, Policy p,
ListOfRequests lor) {
%match(lor) {
requests(R1*,r@(add|delete)((read|write)(subject,resource)),
R2*) -> {
...
if(decision1.isgrant()) {
nextLor = ‘requests(R1*,R2*);
otherChecker(newState,p,nextLor);
} } } }
We should point out that under the same assumption the set of ﬁnal states (i.e.
that are not modiﬁed by subsequent requests) obtained when considering delete
requests is the same as if these requests were not attempted. This is why the set of
initial requests we generate will contain no delete requests.
5.5 Experimental results
In this section we compare the eﬃciency of the simple checker with the one that
successively integrates the presented optimizations. +cache stands for the integra-
tion of the least recently used cache mechanism. +canonical form corresponds
to the unique representation of equivalent states (in addition to the cache mecha-
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nism). Finally, cut on deny corresponds to the integration of the last presented
optimization.
We considered scenarios which involve a ﬁnite number of subjects and a ﬁnite
number of security levels.
The experiments have been performed on a Mac Pro 2x3GHz. For each version
of the program we measured (in seconds) the time to check there is no information
leakage. The columns (m × n) correspond respectively to the number of subjects
and the number of (objects with diﬀerent) security levels:
Subjects × Levels 2× 2 3× 3 3× 4 2× 6 2× 7 3× 5 2× 8 4× 4
Original 0.5 > 1000 na na na na na na
+cache 0.35 > 1000 na na na na na na
+canonical form 0.18 131 na na na na na na
+cut on deny 0.18 3.1 4.4 2.0 10.3 378 1309 63526
These experiments clearly show that without any optimization, checking the lack
of information leakage can only be done in very simple cases: 2 subjects and 2 levels
(na corresponds to memory explosion). The last row corresponds to the integration
in the checker of all presented optimizations and shows that the veriﬁcation of
small, but realistic, conﬁgurations where more than 2 security levels are involved is
possible. These results also show a clear need for new methods and new tools to
tackle problems with unbounded numbers of subjects and security levels.
6 Conclusions
We summarize here the contributions of this paper and discuss some related works.
We have proposed an approach merging declarative and imperative paradigms
for detecting information ﬂow violations in (lattice-based) access control models. We
have deﬁned the state of the system as the list of current accesses and the policy
implementations and the security properties they should verify as sets of rewrite
rules (extended with operations from a host imperative language). The built-in
list-matching available in Tom allows us to express easily the random selection of
all possible access requests which can occur in a given system and thus to naturally
describe the exploration of the search space.
The speciﬁcation technique we have proposed in this paper allows us to explore
a ﬁnite state space, hence it is well suited for detecting possible ﬂaws in a given
policy instance, but not for proving its correctness in an unbounded model. The
advantage of this approach is that the speciﬁed policies can be not only checked but
also used almost directly in applications written in Java (or another host language
accepted by Tom).
We have only speciﬁed two simple access control policies but we claim that our
results can be transferred to other security models as our framework can easily
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accommodate new policy deﬁnitions.
Related Work Static analysis techniques have been applied to verify information
ﬂow in programs. This consists in ﬁnding out every data ﬂow in the code of a
program, and then to avoid paths which violate the security policy. This was done,
for instance, on some extension of λ-calculus [6], or on extensions of programming
languages as in [11]. Most of these extensions include a sophisticated type system
to cope with how information can ﬂow from protected variables with high security
level to lower classiﬁed variables as surveyed in [15].
In [5], the authors verify the satisﬁability of a temporal logic formula in a given
policy model, but it is not clear how they could address information ﬂow. In [4],
the authors suggest to perform goal reachability over Datalog programs as a way to
compare access control policies, but information ﬂow is not addressed as well.
In [12] an approach close to ours is used for ﬁnding vulnerabilities by using
rules to infer attacks from existing access control conﬁgurations in the Windows
XP and SELinux operating systems. Several kinds of attacks are explored and the
formalism used for specifying both the policy and the vulnerabilities is a variation
of Datalog with negation. Our technique is more general, since we model check a
security model instead of starting from concrete situations. We can model other
kinds of vulnerabilities as well by integrating extra rules in the veriﬁcation function.
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